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Abstract
The literature on organizations has long focused on the concept of
coalition behavior. An experiment on coalition formation was designed
as a simulation of organizational decision making groups. Previous
research and a variety of game theoretic and social psychological models
of coalition behavior provided strong empirical and theoretical bases
for the study. Groups of masters students interacted in four sessions
that manipulated the power of the five actors in each group. Results
were compared to previous findings and were used to evaluate the
theories. The findings suggest that (1) revenge was not often used by
the players in these groups; (2) social pressure and the weak players'
ability to communicate depressed the strongest players' outcomes; and
(3) Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) Bargaining theory and the
Roth-Shapley value (Roth, 1977a, b; Shapley, 1953) predicted coalition
outcomes better than the other models tested. The implications for
organizations and their members are discussed.
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Coalitions in Decision Making Groups:
Organizational Analogs
The concept of coalitions is central to much of organizational
theory (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). The notion
that organizations and small groups are composed of individuals with
conflicting motivations and interests is a widely accepted assumption
about organizational behavior. And yet, there is almost no mention in
the organizational literature of the large, growing body of research
and theory on coalition behavior in social psychology, political
science, and game theory (Murnighan, 1978a). Two reasons might account
for this lack of cross-fertilization: (1) The language of coalition
theory, highly formalized mathematics, may be less tractable than most
social scientific theory; and (2) the research on coalition behavior
has been conducted almost solely in the laboratory and has utilized
experimental procedures that do not resemble the coalitional behavior
that organization theorists envision as taking place in the real world.
The current study deals with the second of these issues by reporting
two experiments that investigated coalition behavior in a simulation of
organizational decision making. The first problem will also be
addressed by reviewing some of the theories of coalition behavior from
an organizational perspective, focusing less on the mathematics of the
models than on their underlying rationales (cf. Murnighan, 1982a).
The two studies reported here are conceptual replications of pre-
vious research by Murnighan (1978b) and Murnighan and Szwajkowski
(1979). The current studies were designed to increase the mundane
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realism (Aronson and Carlsraith, 1969) of the task, making comparisons
to organizations more direct. Previous laboratory experiments on
coalition behavior have used a wide variety of procedures (e.g.,
Rapoport and Kahan, 1976; Komorita and Meek, 1978). The current study
relaxed many of the controls used in previous research, and stands in
marked contrast to most other experimental procedures.
For instance, in this study group members were face- to- face and
could communicate with each other almost without restriction. This led
to a variety of tactics, types of proposals, expressed reasons for pre-
vious behavior, etc. Indeed, sorting all that was happening within the
groups as they moved toward agreements is more than can be covered in
this paper. However, this "looseness," when it is combined with the
findings from the previous studies, offers the opportunity to see
whether the underlying coalitional structure that was manipulated within
the groups had as much of an impact in the current settings as it did in
the "controlled" studies previously conducted (cf., Murnighan, 1982a).
As Campbell and Stanley (1966) point out, the more variation existing in
experimental procedures, the greater the degree of generalizability that
is obtained when results concur. Thus, if the findings of this experi-
ment and those reported earlier are similar, confidence in the findings
and in the theories that correctly predict them should be considerably
enhanced
.
One other study (Komorita and Meek, 1978) looked explicitly at the
effects of different procedures on the coalition outcomes of three dif-
ferent games. The changes they made in the procedures were much less
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severe than those involved here. One procedure, which consisted of
secret offers, publicized agreements, and no face-to-face interaction
was identical to that used in our previous studies. A second procedure
altered the players' interactions by removing the secrecy of the offers:
everyone's coalition proposals were displayed so that all of the
bargainers could see them. Although Komorita and Meek (1978) found
significant differences in the players' outcomes as a result of the
changes in the procedures, the extent of these differences was fairly
small. In addition, in three studies Murnighan and Szwajkowski (1979)
and Murnighan and Roth (1977; 1978) found only small effects for simi-
lar changes. The current study instituted considerable changes in the
negotiation procedures, thus establishing conditions where correspon-
dingly large effects on the outcomes may be observed.
The Structure of the Games
An underlying assumption in this paper is that the structure of
a game depends on the sets of group members (i.e., coalitions) who can
make a decision by themselves, regardless of what the other players do.
Operationally, this means that we are focusing directly on those sets
of individuals who have enough power to make organizational decisions
without the support of those who disagree with them. Thus, if three
people form the executive committee of an organization and an agreement
among any two of them is sufficient to set organizational policy, the
structure of this organization's "game" is identified (and corresponds
to the five-person All Equal game in this study, described later). In
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terras of coalition theory, structure is determined by the set of mini-
mal winning coalitions, i.e., coalitions that would no longer be
winning if any member left the coalition. This situation can be
modeled in several ways, preserving the underlying structure even with
differences, say, in resource distribution. For instance, if the mem-
bers of this group have differential control over blocks of votes
(resources) such that the distribution of votes is 4-3-2 or 2-2-1, a
majority of the votes still requires that at least two of the group
members agree, regardless of which two agree. Thus, given the assump-
tions used here, the structures of these two games would be considered
to be the same. The effect of resources only becomes important as it
2
changes the set of individuals who can make a decision on their own.
The eight games studied in the two experiments here had exactly
the same structure as the games studied in Murnighan (1978b) and
Murnighan and Szwajkowski (1979). Four of the games included a veto
player, who had to be included in every agreement: no decisions could
be made without his/her consent. The other four games varied the power
positions of the players without including a veto player (see Table 1).
Insert Table 1 about here
The differences among the games are most easily understood by
referring to the quota/ resource structure, the third column in Table 1.
The first number in each sequence refers to the quota of resources
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necessary to reach an agreement, make a decision, or form a winning
coalition. The numbers in parentheses refer to the smallest strategic
weights that can be assigned to the players in the game. The weights
can be added to determine which coalitions have sufficient strength to
win. They are ordinal, however, as far as comparison of individual
power positions are concerned.
The games have been arranged in the table so that player A is
at least as powerful, and often more powerful, than any of the other
individuals in the game. In addition, as one moves across games from
the All-Equal game to Veto game #4, several theories predict that the
power of player A increases. A strong, sharply delineated difference
is apparent as one moves from the non-veto to the veto games: player A
can no longer be excluded from any agreements in the veto games. This
puts player A in a very strong bargaining position, much like the exe-
cutive who cannot be overruled. In the non-veto games, player A in the
Apex game (the Apex player) also holds a particularly strong position.
Table 1 highlights the range of power positions that can be specified
in these games, pinpointing one of the distinct advantages of the
mathematical approach to coalition behavior.
The current study focuses on coalition behavior within decision
making groups. An earlier study (Murnighan, 1974) suggested that
coalition behavior helped explain the results of decision making groups
whose preferences were markedly different from one another. Indeed,
when everyone in a group holds the same preference, there is little
reason for conflict among ideas to arise. When preferences differ,
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however, a subset of the group may form a coalition and make decisions
in the coalition's interests, rather than the interests of the entire
group. The current study encouraged the formation of coalitions, and
the coalitions that did form were easily observed. Unlike the rules
in most of the previous research on coalitions, agreements among all
five group members were also possible. Thus, the group's inclinations
toward collectivism, in the form of agreements including everyone,
could be contrasted with their inclinations toward "coalitionalism,
"
forming coalitions that exclude some group members.
The study of coalition behavior in laboratories or in coalition
governments has focused directly on the power that the participants
hold in a particular situation. Strength, weakness, dependence,
resources: All of these are terms common to the coalition literature,
as well as the literature on organizations and organizational behavior.
A variety of models of coalition behavior approach power from different
perspectives, and a brief review of some of the prevalent theories
(particularly the theories that were tested in Murnighan, 1978b, and
Murnighan and Szwajkowski, 1979, and which can also be tested here) will
reveal how they view power and its potential use.
Models of Coalition Behavior
Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) Bargaining theory is the model that
has received the most empirical support in the recent literature (e.g.,
Komorita and Tumonis, 1980; Murnighan, 1978a). Bargaining theory is
based on the notion that individuals will use alternative agreements as
threats to try and increase their payoffs within the present agreement
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or coalition. Thus, if organization A is considering a merger with
organization B, Komorita and Chertkoff's model would say that the orga-
nization with the greatest number of resources and more alternative
organizations as potential partners would have a distinct advantage in
the bargaining. If organization A is a dynamic, growing, profit-
generating company, and if A in turn has numerous alternative organiza-
tions which would be willing to enter a deal similar to the one being
negotiated with B, then A should do extremely well. Ironically, this
is true, according to Komorita and Chertkoff, even if the prospect of
A's alternatives are not particularly good. Their presence alone
allows A to tell B, "If you don't go along, I can always get what I
need from C." If enough uncertainty about C exists, especially for B,
A's threat may be credible enough to be effective (Ellsberg, Note 1).
Thus, Komorita and Chertkoff's bargaining model incorporates many of
the notions of dependence common to organization theory (e.g., Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). In dealing with small groups and well-defined
resource systems, it makes explicit predictions concerning the likeli-
hood of different parties forming a coalition and how each potential
coalition should divide the payoffs it obtains. For a more extended
discussion of the model, see Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) or Murnighan
(1978a).
A second model, also proposed by Komorita (1974), is called the
Weighted Probability model. The rationale behind its predictions are
that small coalitions, including few actors (rather than few resources),
are more easily formed and more easily maintained than large coalitions.
Thus, the model would predict that negotiating with a partnership would
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be more difficult than negotiating with an individually owned organiza-
tion. In addition, actors able to form small coalitions are predicted
to have an advantage in the potential distribution of payoffs. Not
only will small coalitions be more likely to form, but their members
will also be included within winning agreements most often and will
gain the most from their inclusion.
Komorita's (1979) most recent model, Equal Excess theory, also
focuses on the alternative coalitions that a player can form. The
theory predicts that all coalitions will initially split the payoff
they can obtain equally: two-person coalitions will split 50-50; three-
person coalitions will divide the payoff with each receiving 1/3, etc.
As bargaining continues, however, players will use their expectations
in other coalitions as a threat to increase their payoffs in their
current coalition. Thus, an actor who is negotiating a three-person
agreement will use the threat of forming a two-person agreement (if
that is possible) to increase his or her payoffs with respect to the
other coalition members. As play progresses, actors revise their
expectations on the basis of their previous interactions, always using
their alternatives as potential threats. This process suggests that an
organization or an individual with a good reputation will be able to
make considerable use of that reputation as one means for increasing
benefits. Continued success would then be expected to lead to even
more success. The model does indicate that there are decreasing margi-
nal benefits as interactions continue, and that stable outcomes ulti-
mately occur when each player is predicted to receive the same payoff,
regardless of which coalition he or she joins.
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Other models that pertain to the formation of coalitions in situa-
tions such as those studied here are drawn from the field of game
theory. The core (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) is a limited model (it does
not always exist) based on the presence of intense competition. It
basically says that a coalition is stable as long as no other coalition
can form that gives every coalition member a greater payoff than they
were receiving in the initial coalition. If more profitable agreements
are available (if, for instance, an organization locates a less expen-
sive but high quality supply of its required resource inputs), instabi-
lity and turbulence will result. It makes no prediction in the non-
veto games. To illustrate, consider the Apex game. If players A and B
are considering a coalition that gives A $80,000 and B $20,000, then B
can do better by forming the BCDE coalition with each player getting
$25,000. But, in turn, A may be able to tempt one of these four indi-
viduals with an offer such as $60,000 for A and $40,000 for the other
player. This will exclude three of the other BCDE members, who will
then be willing to accept less than $40,000 in partnerships with A. All
of the non-veto games have the potential for this "circular" bargaining.
3
In game theoretic terms, no coalition is dominant. Because one actor
holds a unique resource, the veto games do yield a prediction for the
core, one reflecting its competitive assumptions. The veto player
should, possibly after considerable bargaining, be able to play the non-
veto players off against one another and ultimately approach receiving
the entire payoff. Unrestrained monopolies are simple examples of
games where the organization holds a unique resource and acts as a veto
player.
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von Neumann and Morgenstern' s (1944) simple solution presents less
stringent requirements for stability: it requires that a solution set
include all payoff configurations that do not dominate one another (see
footnote 3) and that include at least one member that dominates any
payoff configuration outside the solution set. Thus, in the All-Equal
game, the solution set contains all those payoff configurations that
divide the payoff equally among any three of the five players. If we
consider one of these payoffs (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, 0), where players A,
B, and C have formed a coalition and each is receiving 1/3, it is easy
to find other payoff configurations which dominate it. For instance,
players D and E might lure player A away with the following payoff
configuration: (V2> 0, 0, V4 , 1/4). However, this payoff is also domi-
nated by another member of the solution set, where players C, D, and E
each receive 1/3: (0, 0, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3). von Neumann and Morgenstern'
s
solution set, then, identifies a set of payoffs that should occur fre-
quently over many interactions. While single interactions may yield
payoffs outside of the stable set, rational players should then imple-
ment one of the members of the set, because some member of the solution
set always dominates non-members. In this sense, von Neumann and
Morgenstern' s solution set is "stable." This model might be analogous to
two organizations that try to better their positions by occasionally
trying new partners but continuously return to each other, for reasons
of quality, certainty, or similar philosophy.
Other game theoretic models also exist. The competitive bargaining
set (McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer, 1978) makes identical predictions
to those of the solution set in the non-veto games. Aumann and
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Maschler's (1974) bargaining set and its subsets (e.g., Davis and
Maschler, 1963; Horowitz, 1974; Schmeidler, 1969) make identical pre-
dictions as the core in the veto games. Its predictions for the non-
veto games are identical to the weighted probability model's. One
other model, the Roth-Shapley value (Roth, 1977a, b; Shapley, 1953;
Shapley and Shubik, 1954) makes predictions for the players' overall
outcomes rather than for any single coalition. Although the mathematics
of the model are derived differently, the predictions of the Roth-
Shapley value can be determined by considering each possible ordering of
the coalitions as equally probable and assuming that they form one per-
son at a time, with each additional person accumulating all of the
marginal gain that the new, enlarged coalition can now obtain. Thus, if
player B is pivotal when s/he joins the AC coalition, changing it from
non-winning to winning, then, given the probability of this order of
formation, the entire marginal gain to the coalition from B's joining
should be attributed to B. When this is considered for every ordering
of the actors, and normalized for the payoffs that are to be awarded,
each actor position has a value
,
prior to and independent of the
beginning of play. In 5-person games, there are 120 orderings of the
players. In the Apex game, player A changes any coalition, except BCDE
and coalitions where s/he is ordered first, from winning to losing.
Player A is therefore pivotal 72 times; in like manner, the other
players are each pivotal 12 times. The Roth-Shapley value for the
players, then, predicting their overall outcome from the games, is
60-10-10-10-10.
The Roth-Shapley value, then, can act as a prediction of the overall
proportion of the prizes that each actor might realistically expect.
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Organizations, subunits, or individuals who are central (Hickson,
Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings, 1971) or critical (Murnighan,
1982b) will be more pivotal, in terms of the value, than actors who are
less central or critical, and their payoffs will also be predicted to be
larger.
Clearly, many diverse models predict the outcomes of the bargaining
games studied here. Without delving into elaborate detail about the
derivation of each of the models' predictions (the original sources can
be consulted for these), they are shown in Table 2. It is important to
note that the predictions are very specific, much more so than theories
about organizations.
Insert Table 2 about here
Beyond these predictions, the changes that might be observed in
relation to the previous studies are also important. Allowing players
to meet face-to-face and no longer assigning quantitative resource
allocations makes the current study considerably different from its
predecessors and more like group decision making interactions in orga-
nizations. The presence of recognizable individuals as one's
"opponents" might reasonably lead to a more egalitarian distribution
of outcomes than was observed earlier. The appeals of less advantaged
players to be considered equal participants in any coalition takes
greater credence when strong players cannot ignore the physical presence
and individuality of their potential coalition partners: Greater cre-
dence is attached to the equality norm (Koraorita and Chertkoff, 1973)
when a person just like yourself is proposing an agreement. Thus, the
strong players in this study are expected to receive lower payoffs than
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they did when people could not bargain face-to-face. In addition, the
weaker players' ability to form a unified coalition that opposes the
wishes of the strong player should be facilitated by their ability to
interact verbally and nonverbally. Previous experimental procedures,
for instance, required the members of a non-Apex coalition to simul-
taneously and independently coordinate all of their strategies to form
a coalition that excluded the Apex player. In the procedures used
here, a single non-Apex player can take the floor and vocally dominate,
spurring a revolution (cf. Michener and Lawler, 1971) to counteract the
strong player's power.
The current methodology also allows people to identify individuals
who had played particular roles in past games, particularly the indivi-
dual who had previously held a powerful position. In subsequent games,
which people know will occur, this individual may be subjected to
revenge by previously weak players who have assumed powerful positions.
The potential for retribution (which does not occur in the last game)
may reduce a veto player's audacity/greed/willingness to use so much
power. In the previous experiments players knew they would not be
identified until all of the bargaining sessions were completed. Thus,
powerful players now have another reason to distribute the payoffs more
equally. Moderation should not occur, however, in the last session,
where there is no possibility for retribution.
This discussion highlights several hypotheses, in addition to the
predictions in Table 2. In particular:
(1) Strong players in the current study are predicted to receive
lower payoffs than strong players in the earlier studies.
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(2) Revenge should lead to reduced payoffs for those who held the
strong position in the previous session. In addition, the more an
individual took as the strong player, the worse he or she should
do subsequently.
(3) Strong players in the last session should do better than
comparable players in the other sessions, and should do as well as
the strong players in the non-face-to-face studies.
Method
Subjects
The subjects in this study were 16 5 master's level students
enrolled in one of four sections of a behavioral science course at the
University of Illinois. For the most part, these students had little
or no previous background in behavioral science. To complete the pro-
ject requirements in the course, students had a choice between writing
a library research paper or participating in the bargaining exercises
and completing a paper analyzing their own strategies in each of the
games. The performance in either option accounted for 15% of the grade
in the course. Students who participated in the bargaining exercises
(presented as "'exercises in strategy selection") were informed that
their performance in the games would be compared to the performance of
other students in the same power position as their own. Students could
obtain an "A" grade for the project in two ways, by either scoring
better than the average total points for players in the same position
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as themselves or by doing an excellent job analyzing their strategies
in their paper. All students, regardless of their game performance,
were required to complete the paper. Only with a relatively poor paper
and below average performance in the games would a student earn a "B"
for the project.
Graduate students were used in this study in an attempt to more
closely parallel "real world" coalition bargainers. Although none of
the theories tested here speak to the expertise of the populations they
address, most individuals involved in overt coalition bargaining are
both more intelligent and more experienced in bargaining situations
than the general population. Graduate students who have some stake in
the outcomes of the bargaining, and who are given repeated experience
with coalition bargaining, should more closely resemble such a popula-
tion (cf. Murnighan, Note 2).
A total of 19 groups completed the four veto games; 13 groups
completed the four non-veto games. The sexual composition of the
groups varied; unlike earlier coalition studies (e.g., Vinacke, 1959)
sex had no effect on these results and is not discussed further.
During the course of the games, five individuals decided not to
complete the exercises; four were playing the veto games and one was
playing the non-veto games. All were replaced by students from the
same class. Dropping the course was the only reason reported for
leaving the groups.
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Design and AnalysisV r
For both the veto and non-veto studies, each group played each of
four games for twelve trials, where a trial was completed with each
agreement. The games were played in different orders, with groups being
randomly assigned to one of three Latin square designs to determine the
order they played each game. The final assignment of groups to different
orders resulted in each game being first, second, third, or fourth among
the games played at least three times.
The factors, then, were games (4 levels), players (5 in each game),
trials (12), and order (first through fourth). Games, players, and
trials were within-group factors; order was the only between group
factor. None of the analyses combined veto and non-veto games.
Procedure
The procedure for the veto and non-veto games was identical. The
participants were introduced to the "Interdisciplinary Research Game"
in the class immediately preceding the beginning of play. Students were
told that they would each act as a representative of an engineering
department in a five-person group whose task was to determine how to
divide the research funds available at each meeting. The players were
told that there would be 12 agreements in each session, and each agree-
ment would determine the distribution of $100,000 in grant money.
Representatives were told that their departments would be working on
the research projects whether or not they obtained any funding, and
that their task was to maximize their department's return from each
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meeting. The subjects were randomly assigned as representatives of
the Bioengineering, Chemical Engineering, Metallurgical Engineering,
Agricultural Engineering, and Engineering Mechanics departments. They
were told that, at each meeting, they would be given a list of the
departments which could obtain the available funds at each session.
The federal funding agency was described as one that was interested in
interdisciplinary research, and that certain programs required the par-
ticipation of different combinations of departments. Thus, some
departments would be more or less likely to be included among the
agreements that the agency was willing to fund. In the veto groups,
the fact that one of the five departments had to be included in every
agreement was noted. The games were described, then, in terms of dif-
ferent departments labelled A, B, C, D, and E; the advantages of the
five positions could be easily seen, but identification of which
department would hold position A in any session was not revealed until
the beginning of that session. Thus, the representatives knew the
structure of the game they would be playing ahead of time, but they
did not know their power position in that structure.
Students were randomly assigned to groups, with the constraint that
members be unacquainted. Each group met for their sessions at the same
hour each week for four weeks. They were told which game they would be
playing each week but not which position they would hold throughout each
game. They were allowed to discuss the games with other members of
their class, excluding members of their own group. In addition, the
players were encouraged to formulate strategies for each position
prior to each game.
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Assignment of players to the power positions was pre-determined by
randomly assigning members of each group to a particular "slot." The
"slot" was unknown to the players and indicated what position each
player would play in each of the four games. For instance, the first
slot might mean that an individual would be assigned player position A
in the Apex game, B in the All-Equal game, etc. The assignments
within each slot were determined randomly, with the constraint that no
representative would be assigned the A position more than once. The
players seemed to adopt the role determined by their position imme-
diately: Strong players took command, weak players directed their com-
munication to the strong player.
The players were seated around a large table behind name plates
designating their departments. (This was done to control for seating
position, which remained constant for each of the five positions for
each game and each group.) Representatives were also given a sheet
that identified the agreements that the funding agency was willing to
fund; in this way, the power positions of the representatives could
easily be seen. The experimenter (who played the role of the funding
agency's representative) sat at the head of the table. Immediately in
front of the experimenter was a cassette tape recorder, a microphone,
and a sheet for recording the agreements and the time the agreement was
reached. After outlining the purpose of the study, the experimenter
announced that the group could begin. Discussion quickly ensued. An
agreement was reached whenever the representatives from departments
which could form a valid agreement exchanged proposals and verbally
agreed on a payoff division. Most agreements followed a process where
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one representative presented a proposal that one or more of the other
representatives accepted.
The exercises were discussed thoroughly later in the semester.
Students received feedback, about their performance as bargainers and
about their written analyses of the games. All of their questions were
answered in full.
Results
The veto games were characterized by protracted negotiations, and
sessions often ran for an hour or longer. The non-veto sessions, on the
other hand, proceeded very rapidly. Once the players understood the
game, negotiations consisted almost strictly of quantitative offers and
acceptances. Thus, the non-veto games resembled the previously used
procedure more than the veto games. Sessions in these games took, for
the most part, about 10 minutes. The players had to be ready with an
offer when bargaining began and when it resumed following the previous
agreement. Non-verbal communication during the recording of the pre-
vious agreement often signaled the upcoming agreement. Thus, both con-
ceptually and empirically, the veto and non-veto games are quite dif-
ferent, warranting separate treatment and analysis.
In the non-veto games, the primary analysis was a games (4) x
players (5) x trials (12) x order (4) analysis of variance with each
player's outcome in each trial, whether included in or excluded from
the winning coalition, as the dependent variable. As with the previous
study (Murnighan, 1978b) a significant effect for players (F_(4,144) =
104.55,
_p_ < .0001) and a significant interaction between games and
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players (_F(12,144) = 19.63, p_ < .0001) resulted. These effects remain
significant after the application of the conservative test (Box, 1954),
necessitated by the potential non-independence of the findings. The
data for the interaction are displayed in Table 3. The findings are
remarkably similar to those from the previous study. Removing the
partitions that separated the players in previous studies, allowing
verbal interaction and identification of players who had held strong
positions previously seems to have had little effect on the mean out-
comes in the non-veto games. The only exception occurred in the Apex
game, where the Apex players' mean outcomes were considerably smaller
than in the more structured procedure of the earlier study.
Insert Table 3 about here
In the veto games, the analysis first included only the veto players'
payoffs, in a games (4) x trials (12) x order (4) analysis of variance.
The effect for trials was significant, (_F(11,660) = 2.09, p_ < .02): the
veto players' payoffs tended to increase over trials, except for a sharp
drop on the last trial. This effect disappeared when the conservative
test was applied. The data for the veto players' payoffs in the four
games are shown in Table 4. Although the games show some effect on the
payoffs, the effect is not statistically significant, as it was in
the previous study (Murnighan and Szwajkowski, 1979). More importantly,
the data are considerably different in magnitude from the previous study:
Thus Hypothesis 1, which predicted reduced payoffs for powerful players,
received strong support.
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Insert Table 4 about here
Analysis of the non-veto players' outcomes in the veto games was
patterned after the analysis of the veto players' outcomes with players
(4 levels) included as the fourth factor. The results showed a signifi-
cant effect for players (F_(3,180) = 4.84,
_p_ < .003). Again, unlike the
previous study, the interaction of players and games did not reach
acceptable levels of significance. The means, however (see Table 5)
show much the same pattern as the previous study. Thus, players who
could form two-person agreements with A in veto games 2 and 3 obtained
greater outcomes than players who were required to form three-person
agreements with A in these games. All of the non-veto players received
greater outcomes than the previous study, but the benefits for the
weakest of the players seem to have increased most. Where before the
veto player seemed to obtain identically high payoffs whether s/he
bargained with one or two other players, in this study the veto players
received less as they included more players in agreements.
Insert Table 5 about here
These findings suggest that the veto players in games 2 and 3
might prefer two-party over three-party agreements. Inspection of
the frequencies of different coalition's (see Table 6) substantiates
this expectation for game 2 but not game 3. However, while there were
considerably more AB agreements in game 2 than any of the three-person
coalitions, there were also the greatest number of "all included,"
five-person agreements.
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Indeed, the most striking result among the figures in Table 6 is
the large number of all included agreements in the veto games and their
almost non-existence in the non-veto games. Where the strong player
could be excluded from the winning coalition in any of the non-veto
games, s/he could not be excluded in the veto games. Because the veto
player retained the power to be a required member of every coalition,
the "tough" bargaining alternative available to the weaker players in
the non-veto games (i.e., exclusion) was available only in restricted
form in the veto games. But even considering this fact, more all
included coalitions formed than would be expected from either the
theories or previous research. Also, many fewer two-party agreements
occurred, in proportion to the total number of agreements, in the veto
games than in the non-veto games.
Evaluating the Models' Predictions
For the veto games, the total payoff of the players in the different
positions was compared to the predictions of the Weighted Probability
model, the core, and the Roth-Shapley value. Total scores for each of
the players in each position in each game were divided by 12 (the total
number of agreements in each game) and difference scores were calculated
for each theoretical prediction for each player in each game. The scores
were analyzed in an overall analysis of variance, including games (4),
player positions (5), and theories (3) as independent variables. Because
increasing the number of theories artifactually increases the degrees
of freedom for each test, the conservative test (Box, 1954) was applied
to each F-ratio. This correction simply reduces the degrees of freedom
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for each test. Significant effects were found for player positions
[F(4,330) - 95.29, p < .01], theories [F(l,330) = 95.64, p < .01],
the game by theories interaction [F(3,330) = 7.37, p < .01], and the
player position by theories interaction [F(4,330) = 20.53, p < .01].
The core's predictions were significantly less accurate than the other
models (except for the Weighted Probability model in veto game #1).
The Roth-Shapley value outperformed both of the other models, and in a
separate analysis including only the value and the Weighted Probability
model, the differences between them were significant [F( 12,330) = 10.46,
p < .01 for the games x players x theories interaction] , but only for
the veto player in veto game #1. Because their predictions were so
similar in the other games, veto game #1 provided the best test of
their relative predictive accuracy, and the Roth-Shapley value made
significantly better predictions here than the Weighted Probability
model.
A similar analysis compared the Weighted Probability model's pre-
dictions for overall outcomes with those of the Roth-Shapley value for
the nonveto games. Results were very similar: the games x players x
theories interaction was again significant [F(12,220) = 14.57, p < .01],
and for the Apex player in the Apex game, where the predictions
diverged most widely, the Roth-Shapley model made significantly better
predictions than the Weighted Probability model.
Analysis of the model's predictions for payoff distributions within
particular coalitions (the "conditional on inclusion" figures in Table 2)
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was considerably more complex. The absolute differences between the
observed and predicted outcomes for each player in each winning coalition
were summed and the sum was divided by the number of members within the
coalition. This technique for evaluating theoretical predictions was
originally used by Michener, Fleishman, and Vaske (1976). Difference
scores for Bargaining theory and the Weighted Probability model were
analyzed in a game by trials by theories analysis of variance. The
effects for games [F(3,36) = 23.23, p < .01] and theories [F(l,12) =
34.91, p < .01] and the game by theories interaction (F(3,36) = 13.16,
p < .01] were all significant. Bargaining theory's predictions were
significantly better than the Weighted Probability model's in each game
except the All Equal game, where their predictions are identical.
Finally, observation of the frequencies of the different coalitions
(see Table 6) clearly shows that the coalitions predicted to be most
Insert Table 6 about here
frequent in the non-veto games by both Bargaining theory and the Weighted
Probability model are the most frequent. In the veto games, the high
frequency of the all included coalitions (ABCDE) was not predicted by the
Weighted Probability model.
Longer Term Effects of Strength
The use of revenge against individuals who held a powerful position
(A in the Apex, Pyramid, and veto games, and A or B in the Duopoly
game) in a previous game, the subject of Hypothesis 2, was tested by
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analyses of variance and covariance. In each analysis, the payoffs
received by the previously powerful player were compared to the average
payoffs of other players in the same theoretical position as the pre-
viously powerful player. Thus, if a previous Apex player held position
D in the Duopoly game, his/her payoff was compared to the average
payoff of players in positions C and E in that game. Due to a revenge
motive, player D is predicted to obtain smaller payoffs than C and E.
Thus each analysis included two levels of this "revenge" variable
(previously A vs. comparable non-A's) as well as the structure of the
previous game in a 2 x 4 between subjects design.
Although the average for previous veto players (6.95) was exceeded
by the average payoff for non-A's (7.51), overall and in each of the
games, the results were not significantly different from one another.
The differences in the non-veto games (11.8 vs. 14.5) approached stan-
dard significance levels: _F(1,36) = 3.00,
_p_ < .10. Analysis of
covariance using the previously powerful person's previous payoff as
a covariate yielded no significant effects. Thus, although a revenge
effect makes intuitive sense, it was not reflected in the players' sub-
sequent outcomes: Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Analysis of the effects of order on the powerful players' payoffs
tested Hypothesis 3. As noted earlier, no significant effects (F < 1)
resulted in the veto games. In the non-veto games, the analysis used
order and trials as repeated measures, and a four-level between factor
for the strong players, including players A and B in the Duopoly game,
player A in the Pyramid game, and player A in the Apex game. As pre-
dicted by Hypothesis 3, and as expected from observations of Table 3,
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differences among the strong players were significant (_F_(3,36) = 10.54,
_p_ < .001). The effects for order approached standard significance
levels (F_(3,36) = 2.87,
_p_ < .06); the interaction was not significant.
The average of the strong players' payoffs increased from 40 to 43 in
the first three sessions and to 51 in the last. Thus, when the ses-
sions neared completion and there was little possibility for retribu-
tion, the strong non-veto players were able to obtain increased bene-
fits. Hypothesis 3 was not supported, however, in the veto games.
Discussion and Conclusions
The first hypothesis stated that strong players in the present
study would receive lower payoffs than those in the previous study.
This was clearly supported in the veto games: Mean payoffs in the 90%
range in the earlier study (Murnighan and Szwajkowski, 1979) were
paralleled by mean payoffs in the 60 and 70% range in the current study,
In the non-veto games, however, only the Apex player seemed to lose.
Duopolists and the A player in the Pyramid game did just as well as
their counterparts. While a variety of factors may have contributed to
these findings, the two factors which seem to make the most intuitive
sense are that the new study allowed the weak players to exert con-
siderably more social pressure on the strong player, and, from the
strong player's point of view, retribution was now possible and might
inhibit one's desire to make extreme demands. Both of these factors
are most salient in the veto games. In the previous study, the veto
player could demand an excessive amount of the payoff without having to
identify the people who were either excluded from the agreement or in-
cluded for a very small amount. Also, there was no chance for revenge:
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Just as the veto player could not identify victims, they could not iden-
tify the veto player. In addition, the norms that seemed to form within
the groups, which are addressed elsewhere (Bettenhausen and Murnighan,
Note 3), also constrained the veto players' ability to increase their
payoffs within a session. Norms for appropriate and inappropriate veto
benefits seemed to be established very quickly within the groups, and at
different ranges for different groups. Thus, an intransigent veto
player was often faced with the potential of a united set of non-veto
players. This may also account for the frequency of all-included
agreements within the veto games: the weaker players' best option,
especially in the long run, was to unite and deal with the veto player
as a "single" opponent. From a game theoretic standpoint, such a
situation has no determinate solution: any outcome is possible. Within
the groups, however, different norms could arise to determine "appro-
priate" outcomes for the veto player.
In the non-veto games the only appreciable difference from the pre-
vious study was the reduced overall outcome obtained by the Apex players
More non-Apex, BCDE coalitions (18% versus 13% in the previous study)
explain some of the difference. In addition, the Apex players in the
previous study obtained an average payoff of 77.3% when they were
included in the winning coalition; in the current study the comparable
average was 69.6%. Thus, the difference is not completely attributable
to an increase in exclusions of the Apex player. Indeed, the Apex
players' mean outcomes when they are included in the winning coalition
and the outcomes of the veto players (who had to be included in every
agreement) are very similar. The results suggest a potential ceiling
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effect, imposed not by the conditions of the experiment as much as by
the members of the group the Apex or veto player must negotiate with.
In the previous study, Apex players who demanded too much were soon
excluded by the other players. That was just as true in the current
study: Apex players who began to obtain payoffs of 75 or more often
found themselves excluded on immediately subsequent trials. Thus, there
may be a limit on the payoffs that a player, even one with considerable
power, can obtain in a face-to-face group. Further study of this
hypothesis is certainly necessary, particularly with respect to the con-
ditions that might lead to exceptions to this rule.
The revenge motive, posited in the second hypothesis, had little
effect on the strong players' subsequent outcomes (although it may have
led to veto players reducing their own demands) . This is particularly
surprising when group members clearly identified the players who had
previously held strong positions: they were often told that they would
receive "special" treatment. The fact that sessions continued for 12
trials, and that people could not ignore the fact that one person, even
if it was a previously strong player, was being consistently short-
changed, may have dampened a possible effect. Early research on coali-
tions (e.g., Emerson, 1964) indicates that when the players are aware of
others' outcomes, there is a tendency to equalize outcomes. Players who
took a short term focus, that is, considering only the current game
rather than considering the four games as a whole, may well have been
affected by this kind of pressure, making it easier for previously
strong players to obtain better payoffs than expected. Added to this is
the possibility that previously weak players returned favors provided by
previously strong players.
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The strong players did increase their benefits in the last of the
non-veto games, as expected. In addition, the fact that the non-veto
game payoffs were so similar to those from the earlier study supports
this portion of the third hypothesis further. However, the lack of an
effect in the veto games is curious. Just as few game and player
effects were significant in the veto games, they were also less effec-
tive in offering an adequate test of the other hypotheses. Further
study may reveal the reasons for the absence of these effects.
The similarity between the predicted and observed outcomes was not
particularly striking. As we have argued elsewhere (Murnighan, 1982a),
the particular conditions of any one study may shift the outcomes. The
comparisons of the theories, however, was fairly clear. The difference
score analyses in the non-veto games supported Bargaining Theory; the
analyses of the overall outcomes in all the games supported the Roth-
Shapley value. The continuing inability of the other models to out-
predict those two brings them closer and closer to extinction.
Organizational Implications
The intent of this study was to move toward a more realistic
setting for the study of coalition behavior in decision making groups.
The normal caveats about laboratory research of any kind continue to
apply: The subjects were not practicing managers; they did not have
any familiarity with each other or with the situation prior to
beginning the experiment; their task was unlike any task found in the
real world; and the results of their experience had little profound
effect on them. Serious attempts were made to overcome these potential
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limitations. The design provided the opportunity for empirical com-
parisons with earlier, more controlled studies, and, at the same time,
moved toward conditions more analogous to organizational decision making
situations. The participants have many of the characteristics of the
population they represent. The task was meaningful, involving, and
after the first session, not completely unfamiliar. Neither were the
other members of the group. And just as most of social science impli-
citly assumes that people respond to the contingencies of the situations
they find themselves in, so, too, did the current sample respond to the
contingencies imposed in this experiment.
The results have something to say beyond the numbers and theore-
tical tests, especially if they are generalizable . In particular,
the results were in some ways paradoxical: In the veto games, where
one player had considerable power, all-included coalitions occurred
frequently. This reiterates a point made by an executive who had
observed some of Maschler's (Note 4) rather extreme payoff distributions
in his early coalition study: "You would never see anything so severe
in the business world." In fact, payoff distributions were not so
severe in the games studied here, especially relative to the results of
the earlier veto game study. In situations where there is a possibil-
ity for retribution and where the individuals involved can identify each
other, there may be severe limits to the exercise of power. These
limits are relaxed when possibilities for retribution disappear (i.e.,
when there are no more sessions the strong non-veto players' payoffs
increased) , but they require very special circumstances to be completely
relaxed, conditions more like those of previous studies.
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These limits to power may themselves be limited, as appears to have
happened in the Duopoly and Pyramid games. Although the Apex players'
payoffs dropped, the strong players in these two games did just as well
in the face-to-face conditions as they did in the previous study. Part
of this may be due to the speed with which agreements were reached:
They left little time for the formation of larger coalitions that might
have excluded the strong player(s). In both the veto and non-veto games,
strong players' payoffs were negatively correlated with agreement time
(r = -.16, p_ < .001 in both cases). This supports the logic inherent in
Komorita's (1974) Weighted Probability model. They may also have held
positions that were not considered too powerful.
The fact that the strong players in the Duopoly and Pyramid games
did just as well as their counterparts in the non-face-to-face studies
suggests a further dichotomy of strength: having obvious strength may
increase the limits imposed on the powerful, especially relative to
those with moderate strength. Indeed, as most findings in coalition
research have shown (Murnighan, 1978a) , the strongest players tend to
concede the most (at least relative to theoretical predictions). Thus,
the executive who wields considerable power may do so not at the expense
of a single group, where s/he must make noticeable concessions to retain
strength. Instead, as organization theory suggests (e.g., Hickson, et
al., 1971), power may result from being one of the strongest players in
many groups. Even considerable concessions in each may not affect the
executive's overall strength (cf. Murnighan and Vollrath, 1984).
Alternatively, the current findings suggest that the possibility of
one's exclusion from the dominant coalition may be an important camou-
flage for the extent of one's strength. Many issues and decisions arise
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within organizations; an executive who is excluded from some of those
decisions may appear to be less influential than s/he may be. By being
included in an organization's dominant, deciding coalition for issues
that are most salient, an executive can establish a very strong posi-
tion, one that may already be stronger and continue longer if s/he is
occasionally excluded from decisions on less salient issues. From a
strategic standpoint, allowing individuals with less power to partake
of a ritualistic inclusion in relatively unimportant deciding coalitions
cements one's own position while appeasing those subordinates who have
strong aspirations for control.
The two models receiving the most support from this study suggest
just this point. Koraorita and Chertkoff's (1973) Bargaining theory
emphasizes that, in strategic games, players will focus on underlying
norms that give them the greatest advantage. Norms for equality will be
used by the weak to further their position, while norms for equity will
be used by the strong, who have invested more and expect more as a
result. While these two normative positions will be debated, those who
are pivotal to a coalition, as emphasized by the Roth-Shapley value,
will most often be included in deciding coalitions. Thus, when issues
are crucial to management, subordinates will not be involved in decision
making. Instead a struggle among the individuals who most often form
the deciding coalition may ensue. When issues are less critical, being
excluded will be in the strong player's interests, and subordinates will
be allowed to participate. Indeed, viewing intraorganizational activi-
ties as bargaining interactions sheds additional light on them. The
presence of threats and counterthreats , and the very real effects of the
structure of a situation, as it is defined game theoretically, can
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influence the outcomes organizational members receive. Pursuing the
implications of coalition theories in real organizations requires
intense methodologies. Studying intact organizational groups is another
way to approach these issues. Modeling the group interactions as games
provides a new perspective on the study of groups, and would ground it
in a substantial theoretical and empirical base.
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Footnotes
1. The term game is used to denote an interaction that is strategic .
It does not necessarily imply playfulness (cf. von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944).
2. The 4-3-2 distribution cited here has generated more research than
any other coalition situation (Chertkoff, 1970; Stryker, 1972). How-
ever, the theory (e.g., Komorita and Chertkoff, 1973) and research that
has tested it (Kravitz, 1981; Murnighan, 1978a) has argued fairly con-
vincingly that larger group interactions with more varied power distri-
butions, over and above any distribution of resources, offer more for
the student of social influence than the earlier findings in the 4-3-2
game.
3. A coalition x dominates a coalition y (x / y) if every member of x
receives more in x than in y, and the coalition x can be formed.
4. The use of an instructor's students in his/her own research raises
questions concerning the possibility of unethical coercion. The safe-
guards taken by the author to preserve the free choice of the par-
ticipants are available on request.
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Table 3
Mean Outcomes of the Players in the Four Non-Veto Games
(Results from Murnighan, 1978b, are shown in parentheses—)
Players
Games ABC
All-Equal 19.1
(2(J)
23.6
(2Q)
21.6
(2Q)
19.0
(2Q)
16.7
(2Q)
Duopoly 37
-
4
(33 .2)
34 * 6 (33.2) 8 ' 6 (11.1) U ' 7 (U.l) 7 ' 7 (11.1)
Pyramid ^'\^ 5 , ) 19 ' 9 (22.2) 2 °- 1 (22.2) 6 *°(5.3) 7 ' 5 (5.3)
ApeX 55 * 8 (67.0) U - 6 (8.2) 10 * A (8.2) 13 '°(8.2) 9 * 2 (8.2)
—Variations among players with different resources but identical strategic
positions have been averaged to make the data comparable to the current
study.
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Table 5
Mean Outcomes for the Non-Veto Players in the
Four Veto Games
(Results from Murnighan and Szwajkowski , 1979, are shown in parentheses)
Player
Veto
Games
fl (UZ) 8.5 (3-8) 6.6 (3a) 7.8 (J>6) 7.0 (3<4)
12 (AB.AXX) 11.4 (4>0) 8.0 (1>9) 7.6 (2 _ Q) 7.8 (2>Q)
#3 (AB.AC.ADE) 9.4
(2„
9.0 (2-J) 7.0 (1#4) 7.1 (u3)
'« (AX) 6 - 8 (1.8)
7 -° (1.0) 5 - 6 (1.1) 7 "
4
(1.5)
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